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I. Introduction
The institution of finance exists in principle to facilitate access to capital such
that people or firms may ultimately realize their individual ambitions, and society,
in aggregate, can benefit from the realization of these ambitions. More precisely, as
John Boatright illuminates in his book Finance Ethics:
“finance may be defined broadly as the generation, allocation, exchange and
management of monetary resources…[The activities of finance] are
facilitated or mediated by a variety of financial markets and financial
institutions, such as securities and commodities exchanges, commercial and
investment banks, insurance companies, mutual and pension funds, and the
like. In addition, finance includes the academic subject called finance that is
studied in business schools and constitutes the training that people in
finance – both scholars and practitioners – receive.”1
Over time, individuals have used tools of finance to increase their own personal and
familial holdings, to seek education, and to begin gaining equity stakes in their own
homes, among other pursuits. Corporations have used finance to capitalize new
business ventures, to provide funds for investment in research and development,
and to expand into new markets. Finance, through its various instruments and
practices, has thus enabled people to make manifest their ambitions and has
allowed creative ideas to flourish in competitive markets. Finance, in essence, serves
as the organizing principle that provides for vigorous economic activity and wealth
generation in societies where it functions properly and, as such, “it can be used to
help broaden prosperity across an increasingly wide range of social classes.”2 Given
this capacity to broaden prosperity for all, finance should be used as a tool of wealth
democratization if it is to stay true to its terms of original instantiation.
1
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Four principal human values that motivate institutional finance are self‐
determination, efficient allocation, fairness, and long‐term growth. Self‐
determination allows individuals to explore their passions, develop their talents,
and construct individual lives that they deem worthy of pursuit. Efficient allocation
ensures that scarce assets are utilized as resourcefully as possible, ultimately in
service of the greatest number of people at a minimal cost to society. Fairness, a
fundamental human impulse, as translated through the market, confers to each
individual or corporation a payoff that suitably compensates the scale of his or her
contribution.3 Long‐term growth guarantees that investments that we make today,
whether in the individual, in corporations, or in capital funds, will help us flourish
sustainably in the future. Finance, a manmade tool developed to satisfy these human
pursuits, should be consistently oriented towards their realization. Products, such
as investment vehicles or loan policies, should be engineered to give users greater
self‐determination, provided that these users themselves abide by proper rules of
play. Financial markets, in which countless actors conduct scalable transactions
each and every day, should intrinsically seek long‐term growth by distributing
resources competitively and fairly. In order for market actors to reap the future
benefits of today’s financial transactions, these markets must rightfully capitalize
those endeavors that will constitute our tomorrow. A financial setup that prioritizes
the principles of self‐determination, allocative efficiency, fairness, and long‐term
growth perspective aligns with a well‐understood concept of finance. Finance has a
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social responsibility to pursue these human goals so that it can generate and
distribute substantial wealth.
While society at large would prosper from the proper conceptual functioning
of financial markets, opportunities do arise that allow smaller entities, either
individuals, corporations, or financial institutions, to deviate from their social
responsibilities in pursuit of short‐term profit. These actors’ deviations,
compounded over time, have managed to undermine the initial principles of self‐
determination, efficient allocation, fairness, and long‐term growth that underlie
finance. Deviations arise from the fact that financial institutions themselves, the
“gatekeepers” of monetary resources, have been improperly constructed with
incentive structures premised around short‐term profit generation. Managers of
corporations large and small, for example, are currently evaluated on a myopic
basis, with CEO compensation determined by quarterly or annual production figures
rather than on their ability to create long‐term value. As a result, companies guided
by these improperly incentivized managers seek daily returns at the expense of the
companies’ future growth. In this context of misdirected financial institutions, the
ultimate goals of finance, self‐determination, efficient allocation, fairness, and long‐
term growth, are obfuscated at a great cost to society.
The misdirection of modern financial structures and incentives has manifest
social consequences. Self‐determination in this context for the individual is granted
only insofar as an investment in the individual will generate immediate kickbacks
for lending institutions. Efficient allocation cannot properly locate the companies
that will constitute our tomorrow because these companies’ investments in
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research and development or human capital, so critical for their steady growth in a
competitive economic environment, are not reflected as quarterly returns on a
balance sheet. Fairness becomes an impossible dream, as the gatekeepers of capital
amass wealth through their positions of power and the lower portion of the
socioeconomic spectrum grows at a much slower pace. This wealth inequality then
only compounds over time, drawing finance farther and farther away from its
conceptual premise. Perhaps most blatantly brushed aside by this flawed
institutional setup is the pursuit of long‐term growth. Operating on such a myopic
basis, many firms and companies become naively willing to dismiss those policies
that have proven to generate value over a longer time horizon, such as strong
corporate social responsibility platforms, in favor of practices that simply inflate
daily share prices. The deviations of actors, corporations, and firms, however, are
not inevitable and can be addressed to align finance more intimately with its
fundamental goals. Irresponsibility of financial institutions can be corrected from
within by revised incentive structures and altered accountability practices within
firm hierarchies. It can be further addressed externally by limited but directed
political regulation that preserves the competitive market nature of the financial
industry while impelling each individual firm to accept an obligatory social
responsibility. Such high level corrections could begin to clarify the philosophy that
guides financial institutions, pointing them towards long‐term value creation rather
than short‐term rent seeking. By addressing those institutional policies that compel
financiers and financial institutions to act in ways counter to the goals of finance, we
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can thus begin to synchronize the conceptual ideals of finance with its day‐to‐day
practice.
II. Understanding the Scope, Intent, and Responsibilities of Finance
1. Conceptual Finance
Conceptually, finance consists of the institutions, mechanisms, practices, and
individual and collective actors operating to protect, direct, and allocate society’s
assets. These institutions and actors ideally will seek to channel resources to
growth‐oriented prospects or, alternatively, will allocate capital that produces some
present benefit for one individual or entity while generating a future return on the
present investment for another entity. Products and practices of finance, such as the
home mortgage or a company’s initial public offering, will thus contribute to the
growth of society’s assets over time, while channeling money and capital into those
areas of development with the highest expectation of future success and investment
payoff. Robert Shiller, in his book Finance and the Good Society, explains that as a
prerequisite to financial contracting,
“all parties to an agreement have to want to embrace the goal, do the work,
and accept the risks; they also have to believe that others involved in the deal
will actually work productively toward the common goal and do all the
things that the best information suggests should be done. Finance provides
the incentive structure necessary to tailor these activities and secure these
goals.”4
This characterization of finance embeds critical assumptions about parties who seek
to engage in financial contracts in a social context and, in doing so, presupposes
certain social behaviors and outcomes that result from the successful functioning of
financial institutions. Individuals in society can use finance as an outlet of self‐
4
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determination, provided they feel reasonably assured that those financiers with
whom they contract have their best interest, and personal success, as a mutual end
goal. Firms looking to grow their market share can use the tools of finance and the
expertise of financiers to efficiently underwrite their enterprises, giving them
expectations of optimized returns which they can then use to further innovate in a
vibrant economy. Additionally, finance can serve as a mechanism of market fairness.
It can provide non‐discriminatory capital to individuals and corporations across the
socioeconomic spectrum while still maintaining an economic structure propelled by
competition. Finance, under Shiller’s definition, is able to synchronize the goals of
multiple social parties into a mutually beneficial agreement, producing gains for
both parties involved should they fulfill proprietary contractual expectations and
obligations. These mutual gains, over a long‐term time horizon, should thus usher in
expectations of economic growth and, if properly managed, wealth democratization.
More latent in Shiller’s characterization of finance as the economic backbone
of social contracting are the consequences of deviant behavior by one or both of the
parties to a financial contract. As Shiller points out, finance is an institution
structured by incentives, which can produce absolute gains if incentives are
balanced properly. However, should either party to a financial contract deviate from
its obligations in pursuit of short term profit, this incentive structure is thrown off
balance at the expense of the financial arrangement’s long term success. Empirically,
this can translate into the misallocation of otherwise growth‐oriented capital into
the hands of a less deserving party, which result detracts from long‐term economic
development. This deviant behavior, which so saliently depicts the face of modern
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finance, stands in opposition to a conceptual definition of the institution and will be
explored here in greater depth.
1a. Self‐Determination
On an individual basis, the tools of finance should allow people in society to
access liquidity, manage their personal and familial wealth, and allocate their
resources towards those actions and assets that they believe will enhance their own
quality of life. Such tools historically have included mortgage loans, student loans,
trust funds, and individual retirement accounts, among others. These tools are
ideally intended to give individuals in society the opportunity to lead higher quality
lives pursuing activities and causes that they believe to be meaningful or
pleasurable. It has become clear over time that in order to organize social behavior
in market environments, align individuals’ shared personal and social goals, and
make resources consistently available for the individual achievement of these goals,
it is necessary for sophisticated financial institutions to exist.
Financial institutions were indeed borne of the necessity of individuals to
obtain access to capital to satisfy personal desires and ambitions. Since their first
primitive manifestations as small‐scale collateralized lenders in ancient Greece and
Rome, financial institutions have been in the business of facilitating gains from trade
on an individual level. As Shiller makes apparent in his chapter Categorizing People:
Financiers versus Artists and Other Idealists, finance is a necessary component of any
and all social endeavors involving contracting individuals, irrespective of the field or
industry within which they are contracting. Using the example of “two of the world’s
most highly regarded – and highly priced – contemporary artists, Jeff Koons and
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Damian Hirst,” Shiller explains that both artists “…are not just solitary artists; they
are both financial sophisticates. Both run businesses with numerous employees, and
both are aggressive marketers of their own works.”5 In order to successfully pursue
certain passions, as Shiller notes, it is necessary to recognize the instrumentality of
financial markets in bringing idiosyncratic endeavors to scale. To further the
example of successful artists, while the artists themselves contribute the central
creative and thoughtful dimensions of their works, finance supplements the
production process by locating investors in these works, providing the funding
necessary to complete the works, and organizing markets to keep the art trade
functioning efficiently and lucratively. Although these considerations often lie in the
background, they are no less imperative for the scalability and sustainability of
world art markets. Extrapolated to individuals working in diverse trades throughout
the world, or pursuing a range of dreams, from home‐ownership to higher
education, finance consistently plays a role in bringing individual pursuits to
fruition. As a means to each individual’s pursuit of that which they believe
constitutes a life worth living, then, finance has both great power and great
responsibility.
1b. Efficient Allocation
On a broader corporate basis, the tools of finance should be used to allocate
capital provisionally to those companies whose ideas, business models, and use of
capital suggest successful future growth and proliferation. Whether this success is
measured through metrics such as return on investment, corporate longevity and
5
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sustainability, or employment opportunities that a company could present to its
hosting community, those businesses that receive capital injections should possess
fundamental and intrinsic value that will utilize granted capital most effectively.
Over time, as business needs evolve and demands change, financial products suited
towards capitalizing these needs should, in a well‐developed financial market with
proper accountability standards in place, be able to respond with apt flexibility and
minimal risk. Structured products of various sorts, predominantly debt and equity
lending, can then allow growing, mature, or even struggling businesses to finance
their set‐up, operational, and expansionary needs. Conceptually, the results of these
corporate financing activities come in the form of increased employment, enterprise
profitability, continual business innovation and healthy market competition, among
others.6
Financial institutions such as banks, pension funds, private equity shops,
asset management firms, and community lenders, among others, each has an
obligation to allocate capital efficiently if they hope to serve their specific social
function. These institutions, according to Shiller’s characterization of finance,
represent the “stewards” of society’s assets, helping to match investors with
creative investment opportunities, moving large pools of capital into long‐term
growth projects or investment funds, and providing the capital and advisory
services needed to bring aspiring business ventures to scale. The profits that these
institutions generate from their business activities, ideally, will represent a fraction
of the growth that they help to create in the broader economy as a result of their
6
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operations.7 Provided these institutions follow proper corporate governance
procedures, financial institutions’ profits should be contingent on broader social
prosperity, riding the same waves of economic growth and stagnancy as the rest of
society does (although the correspondence of these two outcomes was most
recently called into questiong during the 2007 crisis in which global economic
markets violently contracted while financial institutions’ profits remained steadily
on the rise). Even those who subscribe to the profit‐driven shareholder theory of the
firm admit that there is social wealth to be generated through this form of
cooperative capital allocation. As Boatright reiterates in his chapter Ethical
Implications of Finance, “the goal of capital budgeting is to find and invest in projects
that increase the value of the firm in general and, more specifically, increase
shareholder wealth, or equivalently, the price of the firm’s shares…However, it
should be emphasized that firms that undertake profitable investment projects
contribute to the wealth of society and this is a major contribution of business to
societal well‐being.”8 Even in the competitive context of shareholder theory, finance
is expected to raise the overall level of social wealth while efficiently allocating
capital according to market demand. In moving capital where it can be most

Rajan and Zingales help to establish this fundamental relationship between
developed financial markets and economic growth, concluding from multiple
studies that “…few would now doubt that there exists a causal link between the
development of the financial sector and the growth of the economy…Finance cannot
create opportunities, but it makes it easier to exploit them: what it can do is identify
the areas of opportunity and decline, and achieve a better match by giving to sectors
with a future while taking away from those with only a past.” (Rajan and Zingales
113)
8 Boatright 32
7
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productive, finance properly guided can help to foster innovation in business, create
jobs, and raise the socioeconomic bottom line.
1c. Fairness
In addition to being vehicles of self‐determination and efficient allocation,
financial markets also have a responsibility to be fair distributors of capital over
time. In order to be fair, markets should be open and equally accessible to each
member of society so that any individual or corporation, regardless of initial
position or context of origin, has equal opportunity to take advantage of the benefits
of financial markets. As financial markets develop over time, they have a tendency to
perpetually allow wealth to accrue to a class of elite citizens, a consequences that
has the effect of unfairly restricting a wide swath of society from accessing finance’s
intrinsic benefits. As Rajan and Zingales recognize in their book Saving Capitalism
from the Capitalists, the economically powerful in developed financial markets have
incentive, and the necessary power, to keep markets working in their favor so that
they may reap disproportionate economic and financial benefits at the expense of
others in society. In direct conflict with this pattern of accrued advantages, the
principle of fairness in the context of financial markets requires that “we should
honor claims in proportion to their strength…we can assert that fairness at both a
substantive and procedural level involves…the proportional satisfaction of claims
existing prior to the making of rules, agreements, or expectations.”9 This definition
makes clear that pre‐existing advantages, which can come in the form of inherited
assets, greater access to educational opportunities, or even broader exposure to
9
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potentially lucrative career paths, should have no bearing on the probability that an
individual or a firm can achieve personal or corporate “success” in society.10 While
this definition does not imply that income inequality per se is harmful, it does imply
that economic inequalities should be consistently checked so as to not create a
generational legacy of increasing social stratification. To this end, financial markets
can regulate themselves to satisfy the criterion of fairness. Rajan and Zingales agree
that, “given the right infrastructure…financiers can overcome the tyranny of
collateral and connections and make credit available even to the poor. They become
a power for the good rather than the guardians of the status quo.”11 Such
parameters of fairness, wherein individuals are encouraged to pursue their creative
ambitions and can hope to be rewarded (or punished) adequately, will ultimately
contribute to a vibrant economic and social structure undergirded by sustainable
financial foundations.
Fairness as a distributive principle is often depicted as mutually exclusive
with the concepts of efficiency and profit maximization and thus can obscure the
theoretical aims of financial institutions. As Eugene Heath describes, however, in his
chapter Fairness in Financial Markets regarding the responsibility of financial
institutions with respect to fairness:
“an appeal to efficiency provides a valuable reminder that the legal and
regulatory framework of bank lending should provide the conditions for
productivity. However, the value of this sort of analysis does not vitiate the
importance of moral considerations such as those of fairness. A normative or
moral evaluation of businesses and markets examines commercial practices
in terms of their foundational principles or in terms of the operations and
interactions that arise once these principles are set in place. The concept of
10
11
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fairness, for example, may be invoked to consider the foundational
framework of markets as well as the rules and regulations of ongoing
exchanges…”12
According to Heath, although fairness is not a necessary component of properly
structured financial market, it may be used as an important criterion against which
to judge the morality of markets. Insofar as we should strive for markets to espouse
a principle of morality, they should thus be continually judged by a strict standard of
fairness. If financial markets are disproportionately conferring profits to the
wealthy, through executive compensation schemes or discriminatory credit
extensions as a result of preconceived expectations, then broadening social
stratification will consistently result as a byproduct of these markets. Wealth
inequalities will compound and exacerbate to the point of market collapse. Should
fairness become a priority of financial market actors and institutions, wealth could
be created on a broader scale, conferring the benefits of financial institutions to the
many rather than to a select few.
1d. Long‐Termism
Perhaps the most fundamental normative principle underlying personal,
corporate, and public finance is the pursuit of long‐term growth. Individuals looking
to accumulate resources to pass on through their families, corporations seeking
sustainability, and governments looking to mitigate future resource risk all can rely
on tools of finance to enhance their long‐term prospects for success. Unfortunately,
short‐term profit maximization generally precludes long‐term value creation,
though short‐termism has seemingly become the status quo for rational activity in
12
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financial markets. As Michael Jensen of the Harvard Business School argues in his
paper Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory, and the Corporate Objective Function,
“short‐term profit maximization at the expense of long‐term value creation is a sure
way to destroy value…[the implications of this are] that we must give employees
and managers a structure that will help them resist the temptation to maximize
short‐term financial performance (as typically measured by accounting profits or,
even worse, earnings per share).”13 Value, according to Jensen, may be captured
most efficiently through strategies of long‐termism: investing in a strong corporate
social responsibility platform, funding research and development, and integrating
intangibles such as customer satisfaction or employee welfare into financial metrics.
With the proper distributive mechanisms in place, this wealth can help serve the
purposes of self‐determination, efficient allocation, fairness, and long‐termism that
also underlie normative finance.
1e. Meeting Finance’s Goals in a Competitive Market Economy
Though finance, by design, should honor the ideals of self‐determination,
efficient allocation, fairness, and long‐termism, financial firms’ pursuit of these
values often seems to erode their individual competitiveness. Can we design a
competitive system in which institutions can realistically translate an individuals’
right of self‐determination into a long‐term profit maximizing business objective?
Are resources not allocated properly to produce the highest possible return on
investment if a firm decides to donate to a community non‐profit rather than placing
its capital into a promising new business venture? As Forest Reinhardt and Robert
13
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Stavins of the Harvard Business School and the John F. Kennedy School of
Government at Harvard University respectively note, firms’ commitments to their
social obligations do not necessarily beget substantial profits in an imperfectly
competitive economic landscape: “in the real world of asymmetric information and
oligopoly, the evolutionary mechanisms that might be thought to preclude firms
from engaging in profit‐sacrificing behaviour are not always effective. If their
managers want to sacrifice profits to promote what they see as the public interest,
they may be able to do so as long as one or more of their input or output markets is
imperfectly competitive.”14 Accordingly, firms can expect to generate reasonable
profits while still prioritizing social obligations such as individual self‐
determination and fairness. The profits may reflect the value that customers ascribe
to a firm’s commitment to its core social responsibilities.15 Or, through providing
individuals with fair mortgage loans or flexible student loan policies, firms can
command customer loyalty and incentivize reciprocity to build their customer base
and lower loan default rates, both profit‐enhancing strategies. Similarly, although a
donation to a local non‐profit might seem to cut directly into a firm’s bottom line,
the reputational kickback may have the effect of improving the firm’s overall

Reinhardt and Stavins 5
Profits may come in the form of customers deliberately deciding to stay loyal to a
firm even in a context of perfect price competition because the firm seeks to operate
in the individual customer’s best interest or it pursues long‐term value creation
through strategies such as CSR; or, if enough firms decide to pursue social objectives
through their operations so as to set an industry standard, the cost of capital could
be raised for non‐compliant firms to the point that their abstinence forces them to
lose market share.
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perception and future profits.16 Though pursuit of social obligations might not
necessarily be consistent with a financial firm’s competitiveness in an efficient
market setting, the efficient markets hypothesis’ failure to adequately capture the
value of intangibles implies that the two pursuits, competitiveness and fulfillment of
certain key social obligations, may not be so mutually exclusive after all.
State policy is needed to supplement a firm’s independent incentives to fulfill
its social obligations. The competitive advantages a firm can accrue by prioritizing
intangibles such as individual self‐determination and fairness must level off at a
certain point, at which juncture firms will begin to see a tradeoff between short‐
term profit maximization and long‐term value creation. It is precisely at this point
where governments must regulate the actions of financial firms so that they can
continue to be competitive and profitable without forgoing their social
responsibilities. As Franklin D. Roosevelt reiterated following the Great Depression,
a time in which the competitive forces of financiers and financial markets seemed to
override our most basic social considerations, “men may differ as to the particular
form of governmental activity with respect to industry and business, but nearly all
are agreed that private enterprise in times such as these cannot be left without
assistance and without and without reasonable safeguards lest it destroy not only
British Petroleum (BP) pursued a similar strategy of profit enhancement through
generation of a positive social image with its “Beyond Petroleum” marketing
campaign. Ann Hand, marketing chief of BP at the time of the campaign, stated, “we
have a shareholder obligation to maximize value and increase sales revenue, but, at
the same time, we can deliver great guest experience and build brand loyalty. That
creates a win‐win situation for our consumers and our shareholders.” Whether or
not the firm was falsely advertising in this campaign is still contentious but this
example illustrates the profit that can be derived from a firm maintaining its
positive social reputation (Cherry 1003).
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itself but also our processes of civilization.”17 Roosevelt continued by remarking that
the corrosive short‐term competitive practices of the banking industry, “…in the sale
of securities, in the deliberate encouragement of stock gambling, in the sale of
unsound mortgages” could be addressed by restrictions on trading practices or new
legislation such as the Securities Exchange Act.18 This regulation, far from detracting
from individual firm competitiveness, applied even‐handed rules to the conduct of
each firm within financial markets that guided them towards their greater social
obligations. By increasing transparency in the securities markets, limiting trading
arbitrage opportunities, and creating greater oversight of mortgage markets, state
regulation during the New Deal helped usher finance in the direction of greater self‐
determination, efficient allocation, fairness, and long‐termism. Though these
regulations have been challenged by new competitive strategies arising in modern
markets, upkeep of this state infrastructure is necessary to ensure that markets and
their component firms remain in the service of their fundamental social goals.
1f. Summary
The pursuit of better ways to achieve simple human goals has always driven
finance forward. Finance can serve as an instrument of self‐determination by
providing individuals with resources to access higher education or mortgages with
which to purchase their own homes. Finance can serve as an instrument of efficient
allocation by placing capital with the best and brightest ideas, those that will shape
our world tomorrow. Finance can serve as an instrument of fairness if it is
adequately socially democratized, maintaining a competitive economic landscape
17
18
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while giving each individual or business an equal opportunity to realize success.
Finally, finance can embed long‐term growth into the process of economic
development, acting as an agent of value creation rather than a short‐term profit
machine. Robert Shiller poignantly states, “the goals served by finance originate
within us. They reflect our interests in careers, hopes for our families, ambitions for
our businesses, aspirations for our culture, and ideals for our society…The better
aligned a society’s financial institutions are with its goals and ideals, the stronger
and more successful the society will be.”19 To the extent that society should strive to
be an agent of individual and collective prosperity, and should foster creativity and
dynamism through its economic markets, financial institutions should share these
goals. Though characterizations of finance today largely focus on the shortcomings
of financial mechanics that arise largely as a result of market competition, we must
not lose sight of the wealth that finance has the potential to generate. Beyond
monetary value, finance can allow individuals to explore their passions, can propel
innovative business ventures forward, can raise the socioeconomic bottom line, and
can achieve these goals sustainably. Under these conditions, finance can work for
the masses, democratizing wealth and promoting the values of a truly “good
society.”
II. How Finance Has Fallen Short
The modern portrayal of finance as principally beneficial to those working
within the boundaries of the financial industry stands in direct opposition to
Shiller’s characterization of finance as the science behind the achievement of
19
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mutually beneficial social goals. Nonetheless, specific and proven deviations from
the conceptual ambitions of finance by actors in the financial space do make this
characterization tenable. Often deviations from the conceptual ideal are a result of
competitive market forces rewarding firms and financiers who can maximize short‐
term profits rather than create longer‐term value. As Rajan and Zingales remark, the
financial industry, by its very nature, could perversely become a means to
preserving the social status quo for those at the top of the economic pyramid
through misuse of industry resources. Accordingly, they note that the sophistication
of the financial industry causes it to attract workers who have had the ability, time,
and resources to become well versed in its subtleties. These workers generally
already constitute an economically powerful class upon entry into the financial
industry, and as such, seek to control markets and orient them in their favor,
although collectively this may entail forsaking the conceptual ambitions of finance.
They claim, “the economically powerful are concerned about institutions
underpinning free markets because they treat people equally, making power
redundant. The markets themselves add insult to injury. They are a source of
competition, forcing the powerful to prove their competence again and again. Since
a person may be powerful because of his past accomplishments or inheritance
rather than his current abilities, the powerful have a reason to fear markets.”20 As
this caveat illustrates, empirical finance can deliberately, unfairly stray far from a
conceptual ideal as a result of misdirected individual and corporate incentives
largely governing the operations of financial markets. Given that finance, and the
20
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proper conduct thereof, holds a prominent position in both individual and corporate
social welfare, the empirical facets of the industry must also be explored to locate
practical areas for improvement that can help shift the financial industry in line with
its broader conceptual ambitions.
2a. Self‐Determination
Insofar as finance is intended to serve as an instrument of individual self‐
determination, there are some severe shortcomings within the financial industry
that preclude individuals from being able to pursue their dreams. Higher education
is one activity that an individual might pursue, with the financial assistance of a
student loan, to enhance one’s quality of life and future prospects. Empirically,
unfortunately, the student loan financing market has become one of skewed
incentives for bankers, investors, and specialty finance lenders, leaving government
and taxpayers to shoulder subsequent costs.21 In deeming certain individuals or
institutions credit‐worthy enough to merit student loan financing, private financial
institutions have recently been able to cherry pick those whom they believe to be
most likely to pay back their loans, transferring the riskiest pool of securities into
public hands. As one manifesto entitled Private Student Loan Financing in an Era of
Needs and Challenges in the Institutional Investor Journal advises student lenders:
“the quality of a student borrower’s education can be highly correlated to the
ability of that borrower to obtain gainful employment after graduation
ultimately impacting loan performance. For this very reason, schools with
high federal cohort default rates and those with historically low graduation
rates have been under scrutiny…Investors in student loan‐backed ABS must
now be aware of the profile of the school type distribution within loan
Costs include assuming the risk of less credit‐worthy borrowers, having to
provide loans at lower interest rates to widen financing availability, and accepting
financial responsibility should borrowers default
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pools…The paradigm has truly shifted from a world in which lenders fought
to be on each school’s recommended list to a world where schools are
fighting to be on a lender’s approved institution list.”22
Contrasting Shiller’s view of finance as the mechanism that synchronizes debtors’
and creditors’ goals in pursuit of an overall social benefit, this depiction of the
student loan market reflects the relatively subservient position of borrowers to
financiers with commanding control of capital. Given that the private side is
unwilling to provide funding, even for education, to subprime borrowers in volatile
market climates, the responsibility is thus transferred onto government to pick up
the financing shortfall. Unfortunately, this structural issue transfers the bulk of
default risk onto government and taxpayers, in pursuit of increasing educational
accessibility, while allowing private lenders to collect on a more stable stream of
loan repayments. This empirical deviation from a fundamental conceptual aim of
finance represents an incentive problem within the broader financial industry,
through which private financiers can privatize profits while socializing associated
costs. It erodes the ability of finance to act as an instrument of self‐determination
and must be addressed when synthesizing an idealist view of finance with a realist
perspective.
2b. Efficient Allocation
A strong institutional relationship between business management and
financiers should theoretically promote broad‐based economic growth and social
wealth democratization. Prevailing data, however, indicates that finance itself
through its products and players is overly susceptible to manipulation by the most
22
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powerful private corporations at the expense of emergent market competitors. As
Gar Alperovitz admits of our current financial institutions in his book America
Beyond Capitalism:
“the truth is, various forms of manipulating the market are central to the
operation of the current corporate‐dominated political‐economic system, not
peripheral to it. They come with the territory – as everyone knows full well
when they shift their gaze away from abstract theory to the real world of oil
company lobbying, drug company political payoffs, Microsoft anticompetitive
maneuvering, and Enron corruption…Leaving aside the morality of the
implicit choices of the present system, countless studies demonstrate that we
currently throw away literally millions of productive people whose
contribution to the economy could be enormous.”23
In noting that market manipulation has become central, rather than peripheral, to
the modern functioning of US financial markets, Alperovitz concedes that our
financial system is skewed in favor of vested corporate interests. Under such
conditions, financial capital simply cannot be matched appropriately to more
worthy corporations or business ventures. Rather, it is supplied discriminately to
industry giants such as Microsoft with the power to adjust the competitive
landscape to suit their own terms. While alternative sources of financing, such as
crowdfunding and microfinance, have sought to bridge this critical capital gap for
smaller scale “disruptive” competitors, economies of scale cannot effectively be built
on these platforms alone.24 This shortcoming of empirical corporate finance, as
Alperovitz additionally notes, comes at the expense of both opportunity and wealth
democratization, representing a deviation from the fundamental conceptual
ambitions of finance. Such a deficiency, parallel to that of the personal finance
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industry, must also be addressed when attempting to reform the infrastructure of
finance more broadly to service its theoretical goal of allocative efficiency.
2c. Fairness
Financial intermediaries have continually failed to channel resources and
opportunities fairly across social classes. This failure has resulted in compounding
wealth inequalities over time, restricting economic development and locking
potential sources of capital growth. Fairness, wherein an individual’s or
corporation’s claim to financial resources or capital may be satisfied in proportion
to its standalone strength, notwithstanding preexisting accumulated advantages,
may be gauged through a variety of financial metrics. One such measure of a
society’s financial fairness is the extent of that society’s “financial inclusion.”
Financial inclusion gauges the accessibility of a society’s formal and informal
financial resources and measures the degree to which that society compels
individuals or firms to take advantage of financial resources. Given that a
precondition of fairness may be the extent to which a society grants individuals
equal access to financial markets and their associated benefits, broader financial
inclusion would correspond with a more “fair” financial market environment. As
Rajan and Zingales note, financial institutions’ exclusivity bias in lending to those
with proven collateral assets, though perhaps financially rational, is also unfair: “the
financier will naturally gravitate toward financing the haves simply because they
have the collateral or connections to assuage his concerns…should we be concerned
[about the bias]? We believe yes, both because the economy cannot produce as
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much as its potential and because what it does produce is not distributed fairly.”25
Biases in financial inclusion within societies, whether a result of underdeveloped
financial institutions or risk mitigation tactics, beyond being unfair, are therefore
economically suboptimal. They keep potential sources of great wealth trapped and
prompt a vicious cycle of wealth inequality that must be closed if finance is to be
considered truly “fair.”
In their analysis of financial inclusion within and among various world
economies, Asli Demeriguc‐Kunt and Leora Klapper of the World Bank’s Finance
and Private Sector Development Team’s findings reiterate the point that financial
exclusion leads to unfair wealth distribution. Specifically, they find that those at the
“base of the pyramid” are much less able to take advantage of financial services due
to cost barriers, access issues, or sheer unawareness of the resources that are
available to them.26 This inability to utilize financial services subsequently
constrains this subset of the population’s growth potential, resulting in increasing
cross‐social wealth stratification beyond simple compounding of income inequality.
They find that adults who hold formal accounts at financial institutions are more
likely to set personal savings goals, receive steady wage payments through these
accounts, and build strong credit for future borrowing purposes. The individuals
who do not open accounts, in both high‐income and developing economies, tend to
be those who do not have enough money to commit to their accounts (30%), who
Rajan and Zingales 34‐35
Intuitively, financial institutions seek to establish commercial banking branches
and financial outlets in those demographic locations where they can guarantee a
stable, less risky customer base. This compels riskier populations of customers to
resort to correspondingly riskier, and pricier, alternative financing mechanisms.
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cannot afford to open the account (25%), or who do not have easy access to
commercial institutions providing financial services (20%).27 The constraints placed
on these individuals, most commonly a result of their inherited social position,
prevent them from enjoying the same benefits of financial resources as those who
constitute the higher end of the socioeconomic spectrum. They are thus less able to
grow their personal wealth and must remain seeded at the base of the pyramid
while the wealthy are able to further prosper. From this angle, it becomes clear that
society has a responsibility to make financial resources available more broadly if
each individual is to be truly rewarded in proportion to the strength of their claim.
Through making financial resources more accessible, we can ensure that “instead of
an aristocracy of the merely rich, we [will be] moving to an aristocracy of the
capable and the rich…[We will be] putting the human being at the center of
economic activity because, when capital is freely available, it is skills, ideas, hard
work, and inescapably, luck that create wealth.”28 Under these conditions we can
hope to have a system of finance that is truly “fair” to all those who utilize financial
services.
2d. Long‐Termism
The focus on short‐term profit maximization over long‐term value creation
has perhaps most harmfully derailed modern finance. Myopic compensation
schemes, direct accountability to shareholders, and insufficient risk oversight,
among other factors, have allowed finance to develop into a “race to the bottom” for
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profits rather than a constructive social enterprise.29 As Joseph Heath explains in his
chapter Agency Theory and Self‐Interest, the individual compulsion to act in
response to salient self‐interests often overrides longer‐term considerations of firm
wellbeing or value creation. He characterizes such short‐termism as “opportunistic
behavior,” which “…is a direct consequence of agents acting in accordance with the
general game‐theoretic principle known as sequential rationality. This is simply the
view that, in a multistage game, a rational strategy must not only be utility‐
maximizing at the point at which it is chosen, but each of its component actions
must also be utility‐maximizing at the point at which it is to be performed.” Heath
concludes from this theory that individuals will consequently “act unreservedly
using guile and deceit – not only when necessary, but whenever it is advantageous
for them to do so.”30 Accordingly, CEOs will have incentive to “cook the books” to
inflate their annual pay packages, supervisors will have incentive to overlook risky
bets made by their employees if they seem to provide short‐term upside, and
individuals who constitute the heart of financial institutions will continue to act
opportunistically at the cost of long‐term value creation. Short‐term opportunistic
behavior, many would argue, has actually catalyzed recent events such as the sub‐
prime mortgage crisis, the collapse of Enron, and the trading scandal sparked by the
“London whale,” leading to large‐scale value destruction at a significant cost to those
in society whose welfare depends on healthy financial markets. This behavior, in the
long‐term, simply cannot comply with a sustainable business or social model.
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That financial capital is often steered into short‐term profit‐maximizing
ventures can be attributed to the reward structures intrinsic to modern financial
markets. Financial analysis, for example, values firms based on metrics like free cash
flow, value of physical assets, or dividend payments on outstanding equity. This
implies that firms with impressive financial statements today will attract
investment while firms committing their resources to intangibles, though perhaps
equally valuable, may be overlooked.31 In the short‐term, it is these firms with
strong tangible financials that will seem to promise the greatest return on
investment. In his paper The Link Between Job Satisfaction and Firm Value with
Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility, Alex Edmans argues that firm
investments in intangibles, though value‐creating over time, are simply not
incorporated accurately into current stock prices. He explains, “…intangibles are not
incorporated because the market lacks information on their value. Since they cannot
be measured, it is hard for managers to credibly certify their value to outsiders.” His
results thus “support managerial myopia theories in which managers underinvest in
intangibles because the market values them only in the very long run. This
conclusion in turn has implications for how to design organizations to encourage
long‐term growth. We currently evaluate managers according to quarterly earnings
announcements. But to induce intangible investment, we must pay them based on

Edmans clarifies that “examples [of intangibles] include intellectual property
(patents and trademarks}, brand, customer loyalty, and human capital. Previous
studies have identified various intangibles that are not fully valued: firms with high
R&D as measured by expenditure, advertising as measured by expenditure, patent
quality as measured by citations, and software quality as measured by development
costs all earn higher long‐run returns.”
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the stock price far into the future.”32 According to Edmans’ findings, those firms who
invest in intangibles are ultimately more successful, more valuable, in the long run.
However, we are discouraging this type of far‐sighted investment behavior with our
current valuation methodologies. In order to give firms the ability to act as
visionaries, then, we must overcome this shortsightedness and begin to quantify
long‐term value creation financially through reformed practices and incentive
schemes.
2e. Summary
Individual and corporate finance, propped up by the actions of underlying
financial institutions, has empirically deviated from its theoretical purpose. Though
the scale of this deviation today is difficult to gauge, it is nonetheless imperative to
begin making incremental improvements in the infrastructure of modern finance to
move reality in line with theory. This shift in philosophy and practice will only come
with a behavioral adjustment of those individuals and firms operating within the
financial industry itself. As Shiller points out, “the essential challenge for leaders to
contemplate in coming to terms with the future of finance is to understand that it
can be used to help broaden prosperity across an increasingly wide range of social
classes, and that its products can be made easier for people to use and can be better
integrated into the economy as a whole.”33 If the future of finance is in fact to be a
bright one, then financial institutions must begin acting responsibly, understanding
their obligation to spread prosperity to the many rather than restricting it to the
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few, and promoting practices and tools that contribute to robust economic growth
rather than short‐term profit.
Leaders in the financial space, whether they are CEOs of corporations or
heads of financial institutions, must reorient the instruments of finance in pursuit of
the democratization of wealth going forward. The student loan market must be a
means of accessing, not barring education. Corporate entities must utilize financial
markets to increase their individual competitiveness rather than bar potential
market entrants. Financial institutions must recognize their instrumentality in
keeping the capitalist free market system healthy.34 Only under these admittedly
more theoretical circumstances can finance truly serve its fundamental purpose and
generate prosperity on a broad social scale.
III. Correcting Finance
Finance can be incrementally improved in order to reconcile empirical
observation with the theoretical aims of finance: self‐determination, efficient
allocation, fairness, and long‐term wealth growth. To this end, future innovation in
finance must have an embedded sense of social responsibility towards the
individuals and corporations for whom finance is allegedly working. Actors within
the financial space must take into greater account the social externalities of their
actions rather than simply analyzing fiscal implications. Lastly, the orientation of
financial institutions must be altered to better align the cooperative aims of these
institutions and the actors outside of the financial space that the institutions are
intended to serve. As Asli Demeriguc‐Kunt and Leora Klapper reinforce:
34
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“Well‐functioning financial systems serve a vital purpose, offering savings,
credit, payment, and risk management products to people with a wide range
of needs. Inclusive financial systems – allowing broad access to financial
services, without price or nonprice barriers to their use – are especially likely
to benefit poor people and other disadvantaged groups. Without inclusive
financial systems, poor people must rely on their own limited savings to
invest in their education or become entrepreneurs – and small enterprises
must rely on their limited earnings to pursue promising growth
opportunities. This can contribute to persistent income inequality and slower
economic growth.”35
This insight makes clear that the principles of self‐determination, efficient
allocation, fairness, and long‐term wealth generation can actually be pursued under
a system of well‐functioning markets. Moreover, such well functioning markets,
when in place, can serve to close the social inequality gaps that have been created
and exacerbated as a product of mismanaged markets. If financial markets are
compelled, in practice, to pursue the principles for which they were initially
formulated, the result will be greater social equity of wealth and social opportunity
going forward. Synthesizing the conceptual and the empirical in finance will become
critical to ensuring the trustworthiness of the financial industry in the future and
therefore is the key to its sustainability.
3a. Financial Engineering in Pursuit of Self‐Determination
Personal financial products must be designed that give individuals the tools
they need to turn their present investments into future successes while also
allowing them to live a life that they deem meaningful. Through an investment in
their own education or in a private home, individuals can increase their own wealth
and explore their idiosyncratic passions with the help of finance. Doing so, ideally,
will give these individuals the capacity to repay their loans, an outcome that is also
35
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in the best interest of financial institutions. This system of reciprocity, based on
honest contracting and trust between individuals and financiers, can be established
through properly designed, humanized financial products.
One creative form of financial innovation that can help establish a symbiotic
relationship between individuals and finance is insurance. Home insurance, life and
health insurance, education insurance, and even more idiosyncratic forms such as
crop insurance, can give individuals the peace of mind that they need to pursue their
dreams while providing them with financial security in the event that their pursuits
do not succeed. Properly devised systems of insurance, in other words, can allow
finance to act as an instrument of self‐determination through its liberating effect on
the individual. In constructing future insurance contracts, as Shiller elaborates, “if
the insurance industry is to become more humanized, it has to deal better with the
real risks that trouble people…” Shiller goes on to explain that current disability
insurance, while hedging some of the risk associated with individual disabilities,
does not fully cover all the risks to their livelihoods. He claims, “in the future,
insurance can and will do much more.” Accordingly, Shiller suggests that we adopt
an innovative new approach to disability insurance called livelihood insurance. He
explains:
“This would be a long‐term insurance policy that an individual could
purchase on a career, an education, or a particular investment in human
capital. One could choose to specialize far more narrowly than is commonly
done today – say, on a particularly interesting career direction – developing
the expertise for such a career without fear of the consequences if the
initiative turned out badly. The insurance policy would pay off with a
supplement to one’s lifetime income if it turned out years or decades later,
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based on verifiable data, that there was less of a market, or even no market at
all, for people with this career.”36
Livelihood insurance represents a product of financial engineering that puts the
human at the center of its design. It encourages individuals to be self‐determinant, it
indulges in idiosyncratic passion, and it provides necessary financial security if the
individual’s pursuit is not successful. Future products, similarly, should seek to act
as instruments of self‐determination to bring empirical finance in line with
conceptual ideals.
3b. Enlightened Value Maximization as a Solution to Allocative Inefficiency
Finance can enhance its allocative efficiency by identifying and funding
business opportunities that generate maximal long‐run social value, rather than
continually catering to the entrenched interests of corporations that dominate
capital markets. One way of doing so, proposed by Michael Jensen of the Harvard
Business School, is to use “enlightened value maximization” as a tool of fundamental
analysis. Rather than determining the intrinsic value of a company through strictly
financial multiples such as price‐to‐earnings or price‐to book ratios, Jensen’s
enlightened value maximization ascribes added value to firms whose operations and
management are optimizing long‐term market value. His valuation methodology,
while not fully ignorant of short‐run profit indicators, “adds the simple specification
that the objective function – the overriding goal – of the firm is to maximize total
long‐term firm market value. In short, the change in the total long‐term market
value of the firm is the scorecard by which success is measured.” This approach
addresses short‐term allocative inefficiency because it “recognizes the possibility
36
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that financial markets, although forward looking, may not understand the full
implications of a company’s policies until they begin to show up in cash flows over
time…”37 By helping to identify investments that will be sustainably successful, this
form of valuation gives financial companies the ability to operate in a more forward
looking manner. It can help them overcome a short‐term bias towards simply
investing in companies with which they are familiar in favor of investing in
companies with more long‐term growth and future value potential. Financial
institutions electing to use enlightened value maximization as their preferred
method of fundamental analysis can have the effect of compelling managers and
directors to act in what they believe to be the best long‐run interest of the firm.
While not a complete solution to the problem of short‐termism, it analyzes
performance based on overall value‐added and long‐term wealth creation, not
simply instantaneous profit metrics. This strategy of fundamental analysis can thus
help refocus managers and directors of firms and can help financial institutions
allocate capital into the proper channels to broaden the scope of economic growth.
3c. Reinstating Fair Distribution of Wealth
Finance must stop contributing to the unfair allocation of monetary and
capital resources. Disproportionate wealth accumulation at the top of the economic
pyramid can be addressed through a variety of strategies, including government
regulation of financial institutions and asset‐based redistribution schemes. One area
in which government can realistically intervene is in regulating the generational
transfer of resources to members of the same socioeconomic class. Inheritance caps
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can limit the amount of wealth that is transferred from generation to generation,
helping to narrow opportunity gaps that entrench social positions. Rajan and
Zingales acknowledge, “inefficient and concentrated control of wealth does impose
all kinds of costs on society. That is why an inheritance tax, structured so that the
rich are encouraged to transfer passive ownership of productive assets, rather than
active control, to their children would make sense…[The tax’s] aim should be to
achieve the efficient distribution of control.”38 This regulation, far from removing
individual incentive to work for profits in one’s own lifetime, has the implicit effect
of equalizing economic market access for all individuals over time. Equal market
access, in turn, can help finance achieve the purpose of satisfying claims in
proportion to their standalone strength rather than satisfying them as a function of
an unfairly inherited legacy of wealth. In this same vein, the government can also
mandate that financial institutions make their resources, such as commercial
banking services, financial advisors, and credible lending institutions, available at
proportionally compatable prices to underserved communities so that the poor can
take advantage of these resources to the same extent that the rich are able to.
Breaking down the barriers to market access for all members of society will usher
finance in the direction of fairness, allowing competitive ideas to stand on their own
merits without regard to prior socioeconomic positioning.
Even more far‐reaching strategies, such as the one proposed by Louis Kelso, a
former corporate lawyer and investment banker, can be implemented that help
implicitly redirect capital in a more “fair” manner through financial markets. Kelso,
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drawing on the earlier influences of Nobel Prize winning economist James Meade
and Yale economist John Roemer, “realized from his professional experience that
one of the main – and strikingly obvious – reasons his rich clients were able to
multiply their ownership of stocks and bonds was that their existing wealth
provided them with collateral that allowed them to borrow money for further
investment…If the poor had access to collateral and experts, Kelso reasoned, why
could they not also make money by investing borrowed funds?”39 Accordingly, Kelso
proposed the creation of a “Capital Diffusion Insurance Corporation,” which would
allow the government to insure individually purchased portfolios of diversified
products. These portfolios would be sold principally to those without significant
previous exposure or access to such financial products. The government in this
scheme would hedge its investment risk by mandating that portfolios remain in
escrow until paid off by dividends, at which point the portfolios would fall under full
ownership of the individual, giving them a second source of income. This scheme
would “ultimately result in a major system‐changing buildup of wealth among the
citizenry” with an added perk being that it “does not propose taxing away or
expropriating existing wealth. Instead, a steady shift in ownership would be slowly
accomplished as new wealth is created in the normal processes of economic
development over long stretches of time.” This type of structural reform, extending
credit fairly and thoughtfully to those in underserved communities, will increase
financial literacy and sophistication in these areas. Over time, capital ownership will
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be implicitly democratized, opportunity gaps will be narrowed, and finance will
structurally be directed towards serving its purpose of fair wealth distribution.
3d. Long–Termism and the Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) Movement
Progress has been made in the field of financial innovation to develop
instruments that intrinsically embed some form of long‐term social purpose or
responsibility. “Impact investing,” whereby capital is contributed to socially
responsible investment vehicles with environmental, social, or governance (ESG)
criteria embedded into their core philosophies, has expanded in the U.S. from a $639
billion industry in 1995 to a $3.74 trillion industry in 2012, with 11% of all
professionally managed assets falling into a “socially responsible investments”
portfolio.40 The expansion of this asset class, a result of SRI’s comparable return
profile to traditionally diversified portfolios, represents a growing demand for
financial products to reflect more conscientious, growth‐oriented investment
strategies.41 The deepening of the SRI field in recent years, as a Rockefeller Institute
Report entitled Achievements, Challenges, and What’s Next in Building the Impact
Investing Industry explains, comes as a result of “growing recognition that existing
resources are insufficient to address severe poverty, inequality, environmental
destruction, and other complex, global issues, especially among Western nations

Fung 51
SRI negative screens focus on removing traditionally socially “irresponsible”
companies from their investment universe. Examples of such companies can include
those that contribute to environmental pollution or have weak corporate
governance structures in place. SRI positive screens, alternatively, will source
companies whose operations can contribute to long‐term value creation through
human capital investment in employees or capital allocation to research and
development.
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that are already reducing their aid budgets and domestic social spending.”42
Accordingly, large pools of capital overseen by financial institutions are beginning to
adopt a stronger social position, intending to compensate for the immediate
shortfall they recognize as having been created within and among modern state
institutions. These funds’ social position must necessarily be supported by a long‐
term, value creation objective rather than short‐term profit maximization. The
recent growth of the SRI field implies that such value creation can in fact become the
mainstream as the SRI market matures, allowing finance to more organically serve
its goal of long‐termism.
The Canadian Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB), with $170.1 billion in
pension funds under its management, is an example of a financial institution that
has taken a long‐term, socially considerate approach to its own investment
activities, believing that it can produce stronger long‐term fund performance with a
conscious investment philosophy. As CPPIB’s “Policy on Responsible Investing”
platform affirms, “responsible corporate behaviour with respect to environmental,
social, and governance factors can generally have a positive influence on long‐term
financial performance.”43 In accordance with this investment philosophy, CPPIB
uses its financial power to help develop spaces like the green tech industry, or to
support companies with more intangible value in the form of progressive
management or board structures. In this scenario, tools of finance are being used to
bolster the infrastructure of the “good society,” creating positive mutual payoffs for
both investors and for society more broadly. The CPPIB’s philosophy has, to date,
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been enormously successful in growing the size of the national pension fund and, all
the while, has been instrumental in driving forward numerous development and
sustainability initiatives across the world. Financial innovations should, accordingly,
embed concepts of social responsibility and adopt an investment angle that ascribes
greater value to intangibles if they seek to be profitable over a long‐term time
horizon.
To continue advancing a culture of moral obligation in finance, it must be
acknowledged that profitability within markets and social progress are not mutually
exclusive. Financial institutions cannot be profitable if they refuse to propagate a
vibrant economic system. Neglecting this social responsibility in turn harms those
who depend on stable, dependable economic growth to realize their goals in life and
in business. Rajan and Zingales reiterate regarding this symbiotic relationship:
“No one will have the incentive to undertake long‐term investment – whether
in acquiring specialized skills or in building physical capital – when there is
no clarity about what the rules of the game are. Thus, the societal pie shrinks,
and more and more of what remains goes to the ruling clique because they
have the arbitrary power to determine shares…The right answer is not to
concentrate economic power even more but to disperse it more widely. And
one way to do this is to expand access to finance.”44
Thus if finance seeks to be sustainable and trustworthy in the future, as it should
given the countless benefits that healthy markets can provide, it must jointly
incentivize cooperative action on the part of both entities in a financial transaction.
Institutions must be assured that they can collect on loans or investments that they
make, which they can gain greater assurance of through lending and investing
responsibly. Long‐term objectives must take precedent over a short‐term financial
44
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prisoners dilemma for this type of financial infrastructure to take root. Should this
objective be achieved, though, the social and financial payoffs to all actors involved
can be increased.
IV. The Future of Wealth Democratization
1. What is Wealth Democratization and should it Constitute a Social End?
Wealth democratization is the process through which inequality is
diminished with broadened access to society’s assets. The focus of wealth
democratization should be the subset of society with restricted access to these
assets, typically those on the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum. Assets can
be material and can include money, shelter, or leisure items; or they can be of a
more intangible nature, and can include availability of high quality education, access
to reliable public safety outlets, or even a feeling of security in one’s own
community. All of these assets are critical to the production of a robustly “wealthy”
society and, thus, we should seek to maximize each individual within society’s
access to these assets if we want to construct a more solid social foundation.
Wealth democratization, because of its multi‐dimensionality, must be a
proactive process, brought about by the restructuring of institutions that direct and
control social wealth. Wealth democratization cannot be achieved through
retroactive redistributive measures or through progressive taxation schemes.
Rather, it must be driven forward by broader economic growth, a byproduct of the
proper functioning of financial markets. In this regard, the orientation of financial
institutions is most critical. Financial institutions, through their products and
practices, have a unique ability to spread or restrict access to scarce social assets. As
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Rajan and Zingales note, “a good financial system broadens access to funds. By
contrast, in an underdeveloped financial system, access is limited. Because funds are
so important, the financier who controls access is powerful, but because access is so
limited, the financier can make money doing very little.”45 Within this example, the
modern US financial markets have come to resemble an underdeveloped, or
improperly functioning, financial domain. Financiers with control of funds, who
have the power and discretion to broaden access to opportunities such as education
and home ownership, have neglected to use this position of power to service the
best interests of society. Rather, by raising premiums on student loans or selling
toxic securities to trusting investors, financiers have often managed to garner
wealth for themselves and their firms at the expense of a greater social goal. To the
extent that a socioeconomic obligation begets finance, institutions must thus be
reoriented in pursuit of greater wealth democratization.
The pursuit of greater democratization of wealth through expanded access to
value‐creating financial tools should constitute a social end. By spreading wealth
more equitably, the tools of finance have the power to raise the bottom line in
society and contribute to a regenerative cycle of economic productivity. In
formulating the concept of a “pluralist commonwealth” in America Beyond
Capitalism, Gar Alperovitz seeks to imagine a society in which economic and
financial innovation is only embraced if its core purpose is to provide for those with
limited access to capital more efficiently or effectively than existing infrastructure is
able to. The essence of the pluralist commonwealth lies in “the principle that
45
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ownership of the nation’s wealth must ultimately be shifted, institutionally, to
benefit the vast majority.”46 Redistributing wealth institutionally rather than
retroactively, Alperovitz argues, stimulates the economy from the bottom up. It
allows those previously excluded from the world of finance to enjoy its intrinsic
benefits and, thus, contribute back positively to the overall economy. A financially
inclusive infrastructure, Rajan and Zingales agree, allows society to unlock
otherwise latent sources of economic growth, which can create a positive feedback
of economic and even social stability. Though more equitable financial inclusion
does not imply, on one dimension, that income inequality will be narrowed, it does
create the possibility that those at the base of the socioeconomic pyramid can
enhance their probability of achieving financial success. Accordingly, they note that
in theory, “financial revolution is thoroughly liberal in spirit. Instead of capital, it
puts the human being at the center of economic activity because, when capital is
freely available, it is skills, ideas, hard work, and inescapably, luck that create
wealth.”47 Thus wealth democratization can underlie a social revolution to replace
the unfairly biased socioeconomic status quo with a more economically constructive
ordering. In reorienting finance to be more wholly inclusive, then, we can also hope
to achieve greater economic stability and long‐term growth.
2. Historical Alternative Means of Democratizing Growth
Historically the systematic redistribution of capital through retroactive tax
measures or a graduated income tax has served as the primary means of
democratizing “wealth” socially. However, such measures are simply insufficient to
46
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promote greater sustainable social equality through wealth democratization.
Progressive taxation, for example, does not provide people with the same incentives
to contribute back to the economy as does supplying them with empowering
financial tools because it is an “after‐the‐fact” measure. It has little to no bearing on
actors’ prior behavior. Further, the opportunity costs of such redistributive
measures are significant: we are economically disincentivizing those with lower
incomes to mobilize their powerful human capital resources, and we are
incentivizing those with higher incomes to seek short term individual profits that
outpace the tax schemes. Still, this form of redistribution has been pervasive
because of its political defensibility and because of the ease with which it can be
systematized. It is clear today, however, that “redistributive ‘after‐the‐fact’
measures are no longer viable, and something much more fundamental is needed”
to adequately address growing wealth inequality trends.48
In deriving alternatives to ‘after‐the‐fact’ taxation measures, new methods of
redistribution have been proposed that attempt, but have not yet succeeded, to
systematically democratize wealth. Measures such as the Earned Income Tax Credit
and more proactive federal tax subsidies for asset ownership seek to generate
economic activity among those on the lower end of the socioeconomic spectrum. It
is the goal of such measures to subsequently allow these members of society to
contribute to a more robust and stable economic growth, with payoffs for this
growth being realized widely and more sustainably through a positive feedback
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mechanism.49 These taxation schemes encourage saving rather than punishing
consumption, and can provide broader access to physical assets that can, allegedly,
be put to more productive use when in the hands of a broader subset of society.
Nonetheless, they are still far from ideal in allocating society’s resources, as they
must presuppose inequality. As Richard Freeman, a Harvard economist and author
of the book The New Inequality: Creating Solutions for Poor America, remarks
idealistically, “if we were to start democratic capitalism with a blank slate, we would
naturally divide the ownership of existing physical assets equally among the
population… Our main strategy – be we left or right – for fighting income inequality
under capitalism, should be to assure a fair initial distribution of physical and
human capital themselves…equality of income obtained in the first instance via
greater equality in those assets, rather than as after‐the‐fact (of earning or luck)
state redistribution of income from rich to poor, would enable us to better square
the circle of market efficiency and egalitarian aspiration.”50 Though this depiction of
a more egalitarian capitalist society is indeed a romantic one, it is simply
incomprehensible that we could revert today to a social blank slate and begin
dividing assets equitably. For this reason, those with substantial control of society’s
assets, namely financiers and financial institutions, should be forced to adopt a
systematic bias in favor of provisioning assets more fairly. If financial institutions
can accomplish this goal, inequality could begin to recede as a social presupposition
as the stratification of society began to narrow. The tighter association of social
classes has several positive implications for future economic creativity, growth, and
49
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sustainability, and thus must be pursued as an end in itself principally through the
reorientation of finance.
3. Finance as the Preferable Means of Democratization
Given that measures such as ‘after‐the‐fact’ taxation and federal subsidies are
insufficient to address the issue of wealth disparities in the U.S., the role of finance
in abetting this problem is worth examining. Finance’s implicit instrumentality in
directing social capital should allow the proper focus of its faculties to play a
substantial role in narrowing ever‐expanding wealth gaps.51 One non‐profit
instrument of finance, the Community Development Financial Institution (CDFI),
serves to illustrate how properly oriented financial infrastructure can play a role in
preemptively redistributing capital for the purpose of wealth democratization.
CDFIs, which can come in the form of credit unions, banks, loan funds, and venture
capital funds, all seek to utilize the tools of finance to broaden initial ownership of
assets in traditionally underserved communities. In doing so, these financial
institutions take a long‐term view of economic development while simultaneously
satisfying a responsibility to raise the socioeconomic bottom line. As Alperovitz
remarks, “the more than thirty‐five year developmental trend that has produced the
modern Community Development Corporation is intimately related to the U.S.
political economy’s declining capacity to address problems of inequality and

OECD statistics reveal that the US Gini coefficient has been steadily on the rise
since data collection began in the mid‐1970’s. Though this trend towards greater
income inequality has been somewhat muted by the impact of taxes and transfers,
the coefficient has nonetheless been positively sloped even when taking these
federal measures into account (OECD Stat – Income Inequality)
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poverty directly through redistribution or through major job‐creation strategies.”52
The CDFI, in contrast with traditional redistribution methods, is preventative rather
than responsive in its approach. It provides traditionally underserved communities
with greater initial access to assets through the tools of finance, where asset
ownership can be leveraged more efficiently and financial investment can be more
tangibly converted into broad‐based economic growth. In tapping these
communities locally, provided that they use the proper tools and procedures,
financial institutions can thus align their day‐to‐day operations with a more
conceptual ideal of finance. In this way, rather than through outdated tax schemes
that simply address fiscal disparities, we can truly begin the long process of wealth
democratization.
Financial tools do not necessarily have to operate in the non‐profit sphere to
have the effect of democratizing wealth. As Waheed Hussain notes in his critique of
Alperovitz’s Pluralist Commonwealth, competitive financial institutions have no
immediate incentive to voluntarily forgo profits for the sake of more evenhanded
wealth distribution:
“For a purely voluntary process [of wealth democratization] to work…you
would have to appeal to the public‐spiritedness of those who currently own
the wealth in society – corporations, private equity funds, large investors,
and so on – to donate money to nonprofits, community development
organizations, employee stock plans, and all of the rest. Moreover, you would
have to get them to donate in amounts that would not only support the
livelihood of small groups of people, but would add up to a fundamental shift
in the pattern of wealth ownership in society. A voluntary wealth transfer on
this scale is not only unlikely, but it would probably be historically
unprecedented…”53
52
53

Alperovitz 101
Hussain 39
46

Given that competitive profit incentives in the private sphere often preclude a
natural shift in the direction of wealth democratization, innovative solutions should
be designed that can simultaneously satisfy this obligation of finance while
producing competitive returns. In this space, Baker and Fung highlight recent
financial developments from the private sector that have sought, proactively, to
reverse an inclination towards wealth inequity. Specifically, they note the recent
ascendance of institutional investors to a position of greater prominence in the
responsible investment space. These for‐profit investors, which include “insurance
funds, public and private pension funds, banks, and mutual funds,” are beginning to
take a more long‐term approach to investing, deemphasizing immediate profit
maximization and investing instead in more broadly constructive ventures such as
microfinance and infrastructure development that will deliver proven, stable
returns farther down the road.54
The Omidyar‐Tufts Microfinance Fund (OTMF) is an example of a for‐profit
endowment fund investing in microfinance that seeks a 9% annual return on
investment, synthesizing the goals of profitability and wealth democratization. The
objectives of this “patient capital” fund, to develop microfinance into a stronger
asset class and to open opportunities for business development to traditionally
underserved communities, contribute directly to the process of wealth
democratization. However, they achieve these objectives while delivering necessary
funds to the University for operations and financial aid purposes. As Tufts
endowment officer Tryfan Evans even noted, “of the two goals [microfinance
54
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support and a high return on investment], the commercial objective of enhancing
the university’s return overrides. This flows from the belief that the goal of
enhancing capital flows to microfinance in a meaningful way can only be achieved if
we first succeed in demonstrating that a commercial investor can achieve
commercial objectives such as supporting the operating budget of an educational
institution by investing in the sector.”55 As Evans reiterates here, wealth
democratization can be compatible with competitive profitability if pursued through
appropriately constructed and oriented investment vehicles. If wealth
democratization is to remain a fundamental pursuit of the private financial space, as
it should be, further innovations such as the OTMF must be designed and
implemented to synchronize the goals of profitability and social responsibility.
Finance certainly has the capacity to ensure that wealth is distributed
equitably in society. A more wealthy society is one in which people can feel
relatively free to pursue their individual goals and interests, and one in which
corporations of different sizes and in different stages can feel empowered to
compete in a fair marketplace. Certainly wealth can only be generated against a
backdrop of economic growth, so financial institutions should only expect to profit
fractionally off of the contribution that they make to such economic growth as
measured by increases in national GDP. However, should the infrastructure be put
in place for finance to spread ownership of society’s assets, long‐term sustainability
can realistically be ingrained into financial transactions with the ultimate payoffs
being shared collectively.
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V. Conclusion
Finance is a human institution. Like all human designs, it is imperfect and
improvable. Finance conceptually should give individuals a vehicle for self‐
determination, should fairly and efficiently allocate capital to the individual and the
corporation, and should take a long‐term growth perspective. As Robert Shiller
agrees, “the key to achieving our goals and enhancing human values is to maintain
and continually improve a democratic financial system that takes account of the
diversity of human motives and drives. We need a system that allows people to
make complex and incentivizing deals to further their goals... It must be a system
that redirects the inevitable human conflicts into a manageable arena, an arena that
is both peaceful and constructive.”56 This simple depiction of finance as an means of
translating individual creative expression into broad‐based economic growth
necessarily engenders a complex system of institutions and products designed to
service these lofty goals. Committing financial institutions and practices to the
achievement of more democratic prosperity, however, is necessary if we want our
financial industry to be a truly sustainable one.
Modern finance has strayed from its obligation to serve the goals of self‐
determination, efficient capital allocation, fairness, and long‐term growth.
Deviations occur at both the individual level and firm level and are largely a result of
flawed institutional design. Individuals in society who inherit a legacy of wealth are
able to more rapidly multiply their resources through the tools of finance, through
stocks and bonds and asset appreciation, enjoying greater opportunities to pursue
56
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self‐determination than those individuals who constitute the base of the economic
pyramid. Financial institutions should work to implicitly remedy, rather than
exacerbate, this wealth discrimination over time. Shiller reiterates:
The democratization of finance…calls for an improvement in the nature and
extent of participation in the financial system, including awareness of
fundamental information about the workings of the system. The public needs
to have reliable information, and that can only be provided by advisers, legal
representatives, and educators who see their roles as one of promoting
enlightened stewardship. When people can benefit from such help, they will
come to feel less strongly that our economy is run by a power elite. At
present most people have little or no such information. Instead they are
routinely confronted by salespeople for financial products, who have
inadequate incentive to tell them what they really need to know. But it could
be different under a truly enlightened system of financial capitalism.57
Indeed, under a truly enlightened system of financial capitalism, equitable
distribution of financial resources can contribute to widened social prosperity and,
ultimately, longer‐range economic growth. It is imperative that we create a
financially inclusive society in order for all individuals to take advantage of finance
as an instrument of self‐determination and for all emergent business enterprises to
have an equal chance to secure investment capital. Through leveling the competitive
playing field, we can make finance work for the many rather than the few and
generate social wealth in the process.
The wealth generated by a properly functioning financial system should be
democratically distributed to ensure sustainability of the system. Past methods of
redistribution have failed to address growing wealth gaps because they have
focused on income disparity, though income only represents a single component of
one’s overall wealth. As incomes diverge, so too do opportunities to access high‐
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Shiller 236
50

quality education, to purchase appreciable assets, and to receive the credit
necessary to advance oneself socioeconomically. Wealth must be democratically
distributed through the implicit functioning of financial institutions. The rising
popularity of Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFIs) as an
alternative to traditional bank lenders, as well as the recent ascendance of
institutional investors, have proven that financially inclusive strategies can promote
broader, more stable prosperity. Indeed, in the wake of the recent financial crisis,
given that these democratically oriented institutions and strategies fared well
compared to traditional financial institutions, these models may provide us with
insight into how we can best navigate the future of finance.
The institutions of finance can work for all. Through proper institutional
orientation, we can maintain a vibrant, competitive, and growing market economy
while still raising the bottom line. In concluding his book Finance and the Good
Society, Robert Shiller notes, “many of our hopes for the future should be pinned on
further development of the institutions representing financial capitalism. We are
easily dazzled today by advances in information technology, and these advances can
certainly interact positively with financial innovations. But the advances in our
economic institutions may ultimately be more important than those in our
hardware and software. The financial system is itself an information‐processing
system – one built out of human, rather than electronic, units – and the field of
artificial intelligence is nowhere close to replacing human intelligence.”58 Indeed, no
algorithm or technological innovation will be able to solve such a fundamentally
58
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human problem as the orientation of our financial institutions. We must take the
reins and steer our finance in the direction of value creation and fair allocation if we
hope to envision a socioeconomic future that is both prosperous and sustainable.
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